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The Idaho Supreme Court's recent de-
cision in Weinstein v. Prudential Property
& Casualty Insurance Co. addresses a dif-
ficult, recurring question about punitive
damages: When does the U.S. Constitu-
tion permit the jury to consider conduct
by the defendant that has harmed people
other than the plaintiff?I The U.S. Su-
preme Court has addressed that question
in several decisions that are discussed in
Weinstein and that warrant a fresh look in
light of Weinstein.
This article identifies five situations in











fies an important Richard Seamon
issue related to the
constitutionality
of punitive damages that was addressed in
Weinstein but has yet to be addressed by
the U.S. Supreme Court.
U.S. Supreme Court cases
The U.S. Supreme Court has struck
down state-court awards of punitive dam-
ages three times under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In
all three cases, the Court held that the jury
improperly considered the defendant's
harmful conduct toward people other than
the plaintiff.
In BMW v. Gore, Dr. Gore sued BMW
for selling him a car, as new, without tell-
ing him that it had been repainted.2 In
state court, Gore won $4000 in compen-
satory damages and $2 million in punitive
damages. The U.S. Supreme Court invali-
dated the punitive damages award. This
was the first time the Court had ever found
a punitive damages award unconstitution-
ally excessive.'
The Court identified three "guide-
posts" for assessing the size of a punitive
damages award: (1) the reprehensibility of
the defendant's conduct; (2) the relation-
ship between the actual or potential harm
to the plaintiff and the punitive damages
... [T]he Court in Phlip Morris said that harm to others can
be considered in assessing the reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct toward the plaintiff..
awarded; and (3) a comparison of the pu-
nitive damages award to the civil penalties
authorized in comparable cases.' Under
these guideposts, the $2 million awarded
to Dr. Gore was "grossly excessive."
The Court also held that the jury im-
properly considered evidence that BMW
had sold more than 900 repainted BMWs
as new outside of Alabama.6 The Court
emphasized that BMW's out-of-state con-
duct was not shown to be unlawful. The
Court said, "[A] State may not impose
economic sanctions on violators of its
laws with the intent of changing the tort-
feasor's lawful conduct in other States."7
The Court in BMW v. Gore did not
completely bar consideration of the de-
fendant's out-of-state conduct. The Court
said that out-of-state conduct "may be
relevant to the ... reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct."' The Court ex-
plained:
Evidence that a defendant has re-
peatedly engaged in prohibited con-
duct while knowing or suspecting
that it was unlawful would provide
relevant support for an argument
that strong medicine is required to
cure the defendant's disrespect for
the law. Our holdings [recognize]
that a recidivist may be punished
more severely than a first offender.9
The Court did not find BMW's out-
of-state conduct relevant because BMW
could reasonably have believed that its
conduct was not illegal or tortious in other
States."'
In State Farm Mutual Automobile In-
surance Co. v. Campbell, the Court again
invalidated a punitive damages award that
was based partly on evidence of harm to
people other than the plaintiff." An in-
sured sued State Farm for bad faith. The
insured showed that State Farm's shoddy
conduct toward the insured was consis-
tent with company practices nationwide. 2
The insured recovered $1 million in com-
pensatory damages and $145 million in
punitive damages.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the
jury's consideration of State Farm's na-
tionwide practices was improper for two
reasons. First, it was not shown to be un-
lawful under the law of the other states,
and its consideration was thus improper
under BMW v. Gore." Second, the con-
duct was too different from State Farm's
conduct toward the plaintiff. The Court
said: "A defendant's dissimilar acts, in-
dependent from the acts upon which li-
ability was premised, may not serve as the
basis for punitive damages."l4 The Court
explained, "Lawful out-of-state conduct
may ... demonstrate[] the deliberateness
and culpability of the defendant's action
in the State where it is tortious, but that
conduct must have a nexus to the specific
harm suffered by the plaintiff."
In Philip Morris v. Williams, a wife
sued Philip Morris in Oregon state court
for her husband's death from smoking
Marlboros.16 At trial, plaintiff's lawyer
told the jury to think about the other peo-
ple in Oregon who had died and would
die from smoking Marlboros. The plain-
tiff recovered $500,000 in compensatory
damages and $32 million in punitive dam-
ages. The Court invalidated the punitive
damages award, holding: "The Constitu-
tion's Due Process Clause forbids a State
to use a punitive damages award to punish
a defendant for injury that it inflicts upon
nonparties or those whom they directly
represent, i.e., injury that it inflicts upon
those who are, essentially, strangers to the
litigation.""
As in BMW v. Gore and State Farm v.
Campbell, the Court in Philip Morris said
that harm to others can be considered in
assessing the reprehensibility of the de-
fendant's conduct toward the plaintiff:
Evidence of actual harm to non-
parties can help show that the con-
duct that harmed the plaintiff also
posed a substantial risk of harm to
the general public, and so was par-
ticularly reprehensible."
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The Philip Morris decision imposed
a procedural limitation on using evidence
of harm to nonparties. The Court held
that States must "provide assurance" that
juries are considering the evidence only
to assess reprehensibility. 9 This seems
to mean that, when the plaintiff puts on
evidence of harm to others to show repre-
hensibility, the defendant is entitled upon
request to an instruction telling the jury
that they cannot consider that evidence
for purposes of punishing the defendant
directly for harm to others.
Weinstein v. Prudential Property &
Casualty Insurance Company
The Idaho Supreme Court applied the
U.S. Supreme Court's teaching on puni-
tive damages in Weinstein v. Prudential
Property & Casualty Co.20 The court in
that case upheld a jury verdict finding Pru-
dential and the company that purchased
it, Liberty Mutual, liable for bad faith in
handling payments to its insureds under
the Uninsured Motorist ("UM") provision
of their policy. The Court also upheld an
award of $210,000 in compensatory dam-
ages and $1.89 million in punitive damag-
es. Chief Justice Eismann wrote the ma-
jority opinion and Justice Warren Jones
dissented. (The majority used "Liberty
Mutual" to refer to both insurance compa-
nies, and this article does the same.)
The jury heard evidence that Liberty
Mutual's handling of the Weinsteins'
claim under the UM provision accorded
with company policy nationwide. Liberty
Mutual's policy was not to pay out a dime
to an insured under the UM provision
until the insured was ready to settle the
entire claim. Before then, the company
would not make payments even for undis-
putedly legitimate medical bills and even
when -- as in the Weinsteins' case -- Lib-
erty Mutual had established the liability of
the uninsured driver.2
The Idaho Supreme Court rejected
Liberty Mutual's argument that the jury
improperly considered the company's na-
tionwide policy. The Court held that the
trial court properly instructed the jury,
"You may not assess an amount of puni-
tive damages against these defendants to
punish them for injury they may have in-
flicted on others who are not party to this
lawsuit."22 The jury instruction and the
Idaho Supreme Court's approval of it are
consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Philip Morris.
The jury in the Weinstein case also
heard argument that its decision would
affect the way Liberty Mutual and other
insurance companies operated in Idaho in
the future. The trial judge accordingly
instructed the jury, "You may assess puni-
tive damages for the purpose of changing
the defendants' or others' behavior in the
State of Idaho, but ... not ... with the intent
and purpose of changing defendants' or
others' conduct in other states or outside
the State of Idaho."23 This second instruc-
tion was also approved by the Idaho Su-
preme Court.
This second instruction accorded
with the U.S. Supreme Court's decision
in BMW v. Gore by barring the jury from
seeking to deter future wrongful conduct
outside of Idaho. The instruction raised
an unsettled issue, however, by allowing
the jury to consider the need to deter in-
dividuals or entities other than the defen-
dants from future misconduct.
In 1991, the U.S. Supreme Court
seemingly approved a jury instruction
that said the purpose of punitive dam-
ages is "protecting the public by [deter-
ring] the defendant and others from doing
such wrong in the future."24 Since 1991,
however, the Court has tightened constitu-
tional restraints on punitive damages. In
particular, BMW v. Gore's reprehensibil-
ity "guideposts" focuses on the wrongful-
ness -- and corresponding need to deter
recurrence -- of only defendant's wrong-
ful conduct, seeming to leave no room for
considering the need to deter wrongful
conduct by others.
For now, though, the use of punitive
damages to deter others is permissible in
Idaho under Weinstein.
When due process permits the jury
to consider harm to others
It can be hard to determine when, un-
der U.S. Supreme Court precedent, a jury
can consider evidence of harm to others in
assessing punitive damages. I believe that
the Court's decisions allow such consider-
ation in at least five situations.
Evidence of harm to others as
evidence of "recidivism"
The Court in BMW v. Gore approved
consideration of evidence of defendant's
wrongful conduct towards others as evi-
dence of recidivism that required strong
deterrent medicine. Under State Farm v.
Campbell, though, the conduct by defen-
dant that has harmed others must be the
same or highly similar to the conduct that
harmed the plaintiff. In addition, under
BMW v. Gore, there must be sufficient
evidence that defendant knew or should
have known that its prior conduct was
wrongful.
Suppose, for example, a nationwide
carpet cleaning company was shown reg-
ularly to charge people for pricier, "envi-
ronmentally friendly" carpet cleaning jobs
when it actually performed the standard,
environmentally unfriendly carpet clean-
ing jobs. The company should know that
this fraudulent conduct is wrongful, and
evidence of that conduct occurring in oth-
er States could show the need for strong
deterrent medicine in a lawsuit brought by
one particular victim.
Evidence of harm to others
to show deliberateness of
defendant's conduct toward
the plaintiff
The Court in State Farm v. Campbell
said that evidence of defendant's out-of-
state conduct could "demonstrate[] the
deliberateness" of the defendant's con-
duct toward the plaintiff. 25 In this situa-
tion, evidence of harm to others is used to
show that the defendant's conduct toward
the plaintiff was not merely accidental.
In the carpet cleaning scenario de-
scribed above, proof that the company
regularly charged customers for the
more expensive service without actually
performing it could show that the com-
pany was acting deliberately when it mis-
charged the plaintiff.
Evidence of harm to others to
show defendant's awareness of a
significant risk to the Plaintiff
The Court in State Farm approved
evidence of harm to others as proof not
only of deliberateness but also of the
"culpability" of Defendant's conduct to-
ward Plaintiff.26 Thus, evidence that de-
fendant's conduct has harmed others may
show that Defendant was highly culpable
in disregarding great risk of danger to the
plaintiff.
Suppose a company makes portable
heaters that, it learns, easily tip over and
have caused hundreds of fires. Also sup-
pose that despite the reports of multiple
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For now, though, the use of punitive damages to deter
others is permissible in Idaho under Weinstein.
fires the company decides not to correct
the design defect. Its sale of a heater to
the plaintiff at this point is arguably more
reprehensible than its sale of the first heat-
er with the faulty design.
Evidence of harm to others to
show substantial risk to the public
In this situation, evidence that the
same conduct that harmed the plaintiff
also harmed others is used to show that
the defendant's conduct endangered the
general public. This use was approved in
Philip Morris.27
Suppose the defendant is a pizza de-
livery company that guarantees its pizzas
will be delivered in 15 minutes or they're
free; that this guarantee causes its driv-
ers to drive dangerously; and that one of
these drivers hits another motorist. The
jury can consider other injuries caused by
the company's drivers as evidence of the
broad risk to the public that defendant's
conduct posed. The existence of the risk
to the public, in turn, bears on the repre-
hensibility as well as the need for deter-
rence.
Evidence of harm to others to
show defendant has engaged in
similar wrongful conduct that is
hard to detect
In BMWv. Gore, the Court said a high-
er ratio of punitive damages to compensa-
tory damages "may be justified in cases in
which the injury is hard to detect."28 The
idea is that when a defendant engages in
a pattern of conduct that is hard to detect,
punitive damages can take into account
the many instances in which the defendant
will have engaged in wrongful conduct
that did not result in liability.
Recall the carpet cleaning company
that charges customers for a pricier ser-
vice than is actually performed. How
many people will be able to tell whether
their carpet was cleaned by an environ-
mentally friendly method? Indeed, the
company may calculate that the fraudu-
lent scheme makes economic sense even
if the company is occasionally caught and
held liable. Punitive damages are justified
to change that calculus.
Summary
This article has reviewed U.S. Su-
preme Court case law and the Idaho Su-
preme Court's recent decision in Wein-
stein to identify five situations in which
a jury, when assessing punitive damages,
may consider the defendant's wrongful
conduct toward others. The Weinstein
decision raises an important, related is-
sue that has not yet been addressed by the
U.S. Supreme Court. That is the permis-
sibility of using punitive damages for gen-
eral deterrence.
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... [T]he fraudulent scheme makes economic sense
even if the company is occasionally caught
and held liable. Punitive damages are justified
to change that calculus.
